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CITY OF CINCINNA TI v. DISCO VERY
NETWORK, INC: ELEVATING THE
VALUE OF COMMERCIAL
SPEECH?
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from abridging the freedoms
of speech and press.' For two hundred years after the American Revolu-
tion, however, the Supreme Court did not construe this right to protect
commercial speech,2 or speech proposing a commercial transaction.'
1. The First Amendment states, in part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment
is made binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides, in part:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; e.g., Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the First
Amendment binding on the states). In developing the First Amendment's value structure,
the Framers believed that free speech was essential to principles of self-government. Alex
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627, 632
(1990) (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), re-
printed in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONsTrrrlON 121 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987)).
2. The Supreme Court traditionally has defined commercial speech as "speech which
does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction.' " Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). For dis-
cussions of definitions of commercial speech, see infra text accompanying notes 43-44, 88-
89, 112-13, 143-44. See generally Kozinski & Banner, supra note 1 (discussing and re-
jecting asserted justifications for distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial
speech). For a review of various theoretical underpinnings connecting communication and
commerce, see Ronald K. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71
Tax. L. REV. 697, 698 (1993) (discussing the modern, indivisible relationship between com-
mercial advertising and speech that traditionally has been protected by the First Amend-
ment); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial
Speech, 71 TEx. L. REV. 747 (1993) (responding to Collins & Skover, supra); Rodney A.
Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection
of Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. REV. 777 (1993) (responding to Collins & Skover,
supra).
3. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942), the Supreme Court ex-
pressly rejected extending First Amendment protection to the distribution of commercial
handbills. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. Similarly, in Breard v. Alexan-
dria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951), the Court declined to extend First Amendment protec-
tion to door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions without the prior consent of
solicited homeowners. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. The First Amend-
ment does not distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech. See U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
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Thus, commercial speech could be regulated freely, even prohibited, by
Congress or by the states.4
In 1976, the Supreme Court finally recognized that the First Amend-
ment provides some level of protection for commercial speech.5 Never-
theless, questions regarding the proper definition of commercial speech
and the amount of protection it warrants remained unanswered as the
Court decided numerous cases under the "commercial speech doctrine.",
6
In 1980, the Court first articulated an operative standard of review for
evaluating claims under this doctrine in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission.7 Even after Central Hudson, how-
ever, confusion concerning the standard's proper application remained.
Early in the twentieth century, however, legal theorists began to formulate principles for
expanding First Amendment protection to commercial speech. For instance, Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, in describing the role of symbols in our daily lives, discussed free speech's
role in the marketplace of ideas during this period. OLIVER W. HOLMES, John Marshall
(Feb. 4, 1901), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 266, 270 (1920); see also Collins & Skover,
supra note 2, at 698 (referring to the marketplace of ideas in the modern context of com-
mercial advertising).
4. See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text. For general, non-legal information
regarding the development of advertising prior to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., see Charles Goodrum & Helen Dalrymple, AD-
VERTISING IN AMERICA: THE FIRST 200 YEARS (1990).
5. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761 (holding that First Amendment
protection is not forfeited merely because speech is intended to produce income); see Mark
D. Lurie, Note, Issue Advertising, Commercial Expressions, and Freedom of Speech: A Pro-
posed Framework for First Amendment Adjudication, 28 B.C. L. REV. 981, 985-87 (1987)
(discussing the value of commercial speech with respect to the First Amendment).
6. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-77, 480-82, 486-87 (1989) (requir-
ing a reasonable fit between a regulation suppressing commercial speech and a state's in-
terests); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340-44, 349-52
(1986) (upholding the validity of a Puerto Rico gambling statute restricting promotional
advertising); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 629, 637 (1985) (up-
holding advertisements of legal services in newspapers); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65, 68-69, 81 (1983) (invalidating a federal statute prohibiting the
mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-64, 579 (1980) (invalidating a state
agency's prohibition of advertising promoting the consumption of electricity); Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56, 474 (1978) (affirming sanctions against an
attorney for his in-person solicitation of injured persons); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,
363-66 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment protects truthful advertising of routine
legal services). For a general discussion of case law in this area, see Mary B. Nutt, Trends
in First Amendment Protection of Commercial Speech, 41 VAND. L. REV. 173 (1988) (dis-
cussing judicial treatment of the commercial speech doctrine). For a brief discussion of
various arguments advocating and rejecting First Amendment protection for commercial
speech, see W. John Moore, Look Who's Talking, 25 LEGAL AFF. 2073, 2073 (1993).
7. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The standard consists of a four-pronged analysis: (1) whether
the speech is false, misleading, or proposes an illegal activity; (2) whether the government
asserts a substantial interest in regulating the speech; (3) whether the restriction directly
advances the government's interests; and (4) whether the regulation was no more extensive
than necessary to serve the asserted governmental interest. Id. at 565. In evaluating the
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In 1993, the Court clarified some of the ambiguity surrounding the ap-
propriate level of First Amendment protection of commercial speech in
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.8 In Discovery Network, the
Court struck down Cincinnati's blanket prohibition on the distribution of
"commercial handbills" 9 via newsracks located on public streets.' ° In
reaching its decision, the Supreme Court attempted to expand the scope
of protection for certain types of commercial speech," to clarify the
proper application of the analytic standard,' 2 and to provide guidance in
classifying speech as commercial. 3
In Discovery Network, the City of Cincinnati granted leases to the re-
spondents, Discovery Network' 4 and Harmon Publishing Company,
15
which allowed the respondents to distribute their promotional materials
by placing free-standing newsracks in various locations throughout the
City.' 6 However, the Director of Public Works, citing a municipal ordi-
nance that prohibited the distribution of "commercial handbills" on pub-
fourth prong, the Supreme Court, in Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989), held
that this prong required a reasonable fit between the regulation and the asserted interest.
Id. at 480; see infra notes 139-52 and accompanying text (discussing the Fox holding).
8. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
9. For an explanation of Cincinnati's definition of "commercial handbill," see infra
note 17.
10. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1516 (rejecting a complete ban on commercial
handbill distributions via newsracks absent an asserted distinction between commercial
handbills and newspapers relevant to the City's interests).
11. Id. at 1511-14. The Court discussed the historical treatment of commercial speech,
from the denial of First Amendment protection in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942), to the more permissive view of commercial speech adopted in Fox, 492 U.S. at 469.
Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511-14.
12. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1514-16 (providing that the City regulation ban-
ning the distribution of commercial handbills via newsracks was neither narrowly tailored
nor directly related to the City's interest in aesthetics).
13. Id. at 1511-13 (citing various cases to indicate which types of commercial speech
are entitled to First Amendment protection).
14. Discovery Network provides educational, social, and recreational programs to
adults.. Id. at 1508.
15. Harmon Publishing Company publishes and distributes free magazines advertising
real estate nationwide. Id.
16. Id. Discovery advertises its programming activities in a magazine published nine
times annually. Id. While consisting mainly of promotional advertisements, these
magazines also include information about topics of general interest. Id. Discovery distrib-
uted approximately one-third of its magazines through the 38 newsracks that it was li-
censed to use. Id.
Harmon distributes its real estate magazine, which includes listings and photographs of
available realty in the greater Cincinnati area, along with information about interest rates,
market trends, and other real estate matters, through 24 newsracks licensed by the City.
Id. The newsracks accounted for only 15% of the magazine's total distribution in Cincin-
nati. Id.
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lic property, subsequently revoked the respondents' licenses.17 The
respondents then sought declaratory and injunctive relief from enforce-
ment of the revocation in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Ohio. 8 Finding that the publications were commercial
speech and were entitled to First Amendment protection, the district
court granted relief. 9
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that commercial speech may be restricted only when the regulation
seeks to proscribe false or misleading advertising or the adverse effects
17. Section 714-1-C of the Cincinnati Municipal Code provides:
Commercial Handbill shall mean any printed or written matter, dodger, circu-
lar, leaflet, pamphlet, paper, booklet or any other printed or otherwise repro-
duced original or copies of any matter of literature:
a. Which advertises for sale any merchandise, product, commodity or thing; or
b. Which directs attention to any business or mercantile or commercial estab-
lishment, or other activity, for the purpose of directly promoting the interest
thereof by sales; or
c. Which directs attention or advertises any meeting, theatrical performance,
exhibition or event of any kind for which an admission fee is charged for the
purpose of private gain or profit.
CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE § 714-1-C (1992). Finding that the petitioners' publications fit
within this definition, the City asserted that distribution of these magazines was prohibited
by section 714-23, which provides:
No person shall throw or deposit any commercial or non-commercial handbill
in or upon any sidewalk, street or other public place within the city. Nor shall any
person hand out or distribute or sell any commercial handbill in any public place.
Provided, however, that it shall not be unlawful on any sidewalk, street or other
public place within the city for any person to hand out or distribute, without
charge to the receiver thereof, any non-commercial handbill to any person willing
to accept it, except within or around the city hall building.
Id. § 714-23.
18. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1508. Petitioners filed their action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Discovery Network, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 946 F.2d 464,466 (6th
Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993). This provision provides for a civil action against
any person, "who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory ... subjects ... any . . . person within the jurisdiction ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). For a more detailed discussion of section 1983 claims with regard
to municipal liability, see David Y. Bannard, Note, A Foreseeability-Based Standard for the
Determination of Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 28 B.C. L. REV. 937 (1987).
19. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1509. The district court rejected the City's con-
tention that there was a "reasonable 'fit,'" as required by Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 480 (1989), between its ban on commercial speech and furthering its interests in
safety and aesthetics. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1509 (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 480).
The ban, however, only removed 62 out of a total of 2000 newsracks from the City's streets.
Id. at 1510. Thus, the court reasoned that the regulation only minimally improved safety
and aesthetics while completely suppressing an entire category of protected speech. Id. at
1517. Furthermore, the court determined that Cincinnati could have served its interests in
safety and aesthetics by regulating the size, shape, placement, and number of newsracks,
rather than by eliminating only those distributing commercial handbills. Id. at 1510.
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therefrom.2° The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling after de-
termining that the City failed to establish a "reasonable fit" between its
complete suppression of commercial speech and the "minuscule" benefits
to its governmental interests in safety and aesthetics.2 ' Furthermore, the
Sixth Circuit rejected Cincinnati's argument that all commercial speech is
of low First Amendment value.22
The Supreme Court granted certiorari23 and affirmed the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision.24 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, dismissed the
City's argument that all commercial speech is of low value.' Further, the
Court determined that a "reasonable fit" standard is not satisfied when
the regulation bears no relationship to serving the articulated governmen-
tal interests26 and when the government has not carefully calculated the
costs of the burden imposed on the speech.27
In concurrence, Justice Blackmun wrote that "truthful, noncoercive
commercial speech concerning lawful activities" should be afforded full
First Amendment protection, considering the significant individual and
societal interests in the uninhibited dissemination of such commercial in-
formation.28 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, joined by Justices White
and Thomas, argued that commercial speech is less valuable than other
forms of protected speech and that the City successfully established a rea-
sonable fit between the regulation and its legislative objectives.
29
This Note surveys the development of the commercial speech doctrine
and the likely impact of City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. on
commercial speech jurisprudence. This Note begins by studying the early
rejection and initial accordance of First Amendment protection to com-
mercial speech. This Note then reviews the articulation and refinement
20. Discovery Network, 946 F.2d at 469-70.
21. Id. at 471-72 (focusing on the fact that Cincinnati's regulation concerned the man-
ner of distribution, and not the content, of the magazines). As it had done in the district
court, the City argued that judicial precedent affording lesser protection to commercial
speech justified its selective ban of commercial handbills. Id. at 469. Like the district
court, the Sixth Circuit focused its analysis on the proper interpretation and application of
the reasonable fit standard developed in Fox. Id. at 468; see infra notes 139-52 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Fox holding).
22. Discovery Network, 946 F.2d at 471.
23. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1290 (1992).
24. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
25. Id. at 1511-12.
26. Id. at 1517 (finding that the regulation did not limit the number of newsracks to
advance the City's safety and aesthetic interests, but rather, it "limited [only] the number
of newsracks distributing commercial publications").
27. Id. at 1511-16 (asserting that Cincinnati justified its regulation with the bare con-
tention that commercial speech had low First Amendment value).
28. Id. at 1517 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 1521-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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of the analytic framework used to evaluate commercial speech regula-
tions and studies the expanded protection proffered in Discovery Net-
work. Next, this Note examines the separate opinions in Discovery
Network and analyzes the potential ramifications of each on future com-
mercial speech regulations. This Note contends that the majority opinion
in Discovery Network appropriately expands protection of commercial
speech by rejecting the view that all commercial speech is of low value
and by illustrating the application of the reasonable fit standard. This
Note concludes, however, that the Court's failure to reconstruct the ap-
plication of the analytic framework currently utilized in commercial
speech cases will diminish the effect of the Court's present stance that
truthful, noncoercive commercial speech is of high First Amendment
value.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
A. Early Rejection of Protection for Commercial Speech
In 1942, the Supreme Court decided that the Constitution did not pro-
tect commercial advertising in Valentine v. Chrestensen.3° Without citing
precedent, the Court rejected the claim that the First Amendment pro-
tects commercial handbills and asserted that the Constitution does not
restrict government regulation of purely "commercial advertising."'"
Even this brief, early Supreme Court opinion indicated the difficulties
courts would encounter in defining commercial speech.32
30. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The respondent, the owner of a submarine, sued to enjoin the
Commissioner of the New York City Police Department from enforcing a municipal ordi-
nance that prohibited the distribution on city streets of handbills soliciting visitors for an
admission fee. Id. at 53. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted a permanent injunction, Chrestensen v. Valentine, 34 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y.
1940), aff'd, 122 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941), rev'd, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), which was affirmed by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122
F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941), rev'd, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). For a detailed discussion of the develop-
ment of the commercial speech doctrine through Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., see Thomas W. Merrill, Comment, First Amendment
Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CH. L.
REV. 205 (1976).
31. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 54. Deferring to the judgment of the legislature in a two
paragraph discussion of the issues presented, the Court stated, "[wie are ... clear that the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial ad-
vertising." Id. Various justices criticized this opinion in subsequent decisions. See Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 759 n.16
(1976) (reviewing the numerous criticisms of Chrestensen); see also Kozinski & Banner,
supra note 1, at 627-28 (criticizing the absence of a legal foundation for the reasoning of
the Chrestensen Court).
32. In the last paragraph of the Chrestensen opinion, the Court recognized the diffi-
culty of categorizing a unitary message when one portion of the message is targeted at the
1252 [Vol. 43:1247
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Nine years later, in Breard v. Alexandria,33 the Court affirmed the con-
viction of a magazine subscription salesman who violated a local ordi-
nance prohibiting the door-to-door solicitation of magazine and
periodical subscriptions.34 Addressing the First Amendment claim, the
Court decided that the privacy rights of residence owners outweighed the
rights of solicitors to use this particular method to increase their subscrip-
tion sales.35 In a strong dissent, Justice Black asserted that the design and
philosophy of the American economic system requires the freedom to
solicit paying subscribers.36 Justice Black's dissent in Breard later would
serve as a foundation to the Burger Court's accordance of First Amend-
ment protection to commercial speech.3 7
general public interest and another portion concerns the furtherance of private profit.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 55. This problem arises in most commercial speech decisions. See
Kozinski & Banner, supra note 1, at 640-42; see also infra notes 79-81, 88-89 and accompa-
nying text, and infra text accompanying notes 111-13, 143, 174-76.
33. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
34. Id. at 644-45.
35. Id. The Court relied heavily on a quantification of all private owners whose pri-
vacy interests may have been invaded, as opposed to the economic interest of the sole
corporation that would have been served by a favorable decision. Id. at 636-37; see Nutt,
supra note 6, at 177-79 (discussing the development of content-based commercial speech
regulation analysis).
36. Breard, 341 U.S. at 650 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black argued that the solici-
tation of subscribers is vital to the freedom of the press in the American economic system
and to related rights to publish and circulate. Id. In this case, he argued, the burden
should have been placed on the landowner to forbid such solicitation rather than denying
all First Amendment protection to this solicitation. Id. Justice Black acknowledged, how-
ever, that he would not have afforded this protection to an ordinary merchant who solicits
door-to-door. Id. at 650 (footnote unnumbered). For a more detailed discussion of the
Supreme Court's early treatment of commercial speech, see Samuel A. DiLullo, The Pres-
ent Status of Commercial Speech: Looking for a Clear Definition, 90 DICK. L. REV. 705,
705-11 (1986).
At least one commentator has argued that by granting significant First Amendment pro-
tection to commercial speech, the government would encourage rational development of
the individual-with rational self-fulfillment as the basis of the First Amendment's value
structure. Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 444 (1971). In
1971, Professor Martin Redish explained that
given the current apathy on the part of many segments of the public towards
issues of great political and social concern, it is arguable that for many, the only
realistic means to stimulate use of the rational processes is to encourage the ra-
tional solution of problems that face individuals in their everyday life [sic]. Com-
peting informational advertising in the commercial realm aids in the performance
of this function.
Id.
37. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 762-65 (1976) (discussing consumer interest in the free flow of commercial
information).
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B. Extending First Amendment Protection to Commercial Speech
1. Initial Protection
The Supreme Court first extended First Amendment protection to
commercial speech in 1976 in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.38 In Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy, the Court invalidated a Virginia statute that prohibited price
advertising by pharmacists.39 Three components of the majority opinion
would serve as a foundation for similar reasoning extending First Amend-
ment protection to commercial speech in subsequent opinions: the ac-
knowledgement that commercial speech serves significant interests;40 the
definition of this class of speech;4' and the illustration of an analytic
mode for evaluating commercial speech regulations.42
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court explicitly defined com-
mercial speech as that "which does 'no more than propose a commercial
transaction.' "I Nevertheless, the Court stated that commercial speech is
not entitled to full First Amendment protection, citing, as a justification,
commercial speech's durability from the chilling effect of regulation.
4
38. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The appellees challenged a state statute that prohibited phar-
macists from advertising their prices for services or drugs. Id. at 749-50. Of particular
importance to the Court's resolution was the fact that the appellees were not pharmacists,
but were drug consumers who claimed that the First Amendment protected their rights to
receive price information advertised by pharmacists. Id. at 753-54. As did the district
court, the Supreme Court found that the consumers' interests in the free flow of price
information outweighed the State's interest in maintaining professionalism. Id. at 754-56.
39. Id. at 750; see Lurie, supra note 5, at 986-87 (discussing Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy).
40. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-64. These significant interests in-
cluded, in addition to the speaker's commercial interest, an individual and societal interest
in the free flow of commercial information to aid in effectuating various personal financial
resource allocation decisions. Id.; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 894 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that suppression of commercial speech carries political as
well as economic ramifications); DiLullo, supra note 38, at 729 (arguing that protection of
commercial speech enhances protection of political speech); see infra notes 45-48 and ac-
companying text (discussing the significance of commercial speech in making economic
decisions).
41. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-62; see infra note 43 and accompa-
nying text.
42. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762-70; see Nutt, supra note 6, at 180-
83 (analyzing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy).
43. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). One commentator
analogized language in advertising to language in a sales contract. Daniel A. Farber, Com-
mercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 372, 386-89 (1979).
44. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24. In a statement often re-
peated in subsequent decisions, the Court stated that "[tlhere are commonsense differ-
ences between speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction,' and
other varieties .... [These differences] suggest that a different degree of protection is
1254 [Vol. 43:1247
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Considering the merits of commercial speech,45 the Court found that
consumer and societal interests46 in the free flow of information may be
greater than their interests in current political events. 47 According to the
necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is
unimpaired." Id. (quoting Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385). These differences include the
ease with which commercial speech can be verified by its disseminator and its durability
with regard to regulation. Id. The Court reasoned that "[slince advertising is the sine qua
non of commercial profits," it would not be abandoned solely because of governmental
regulation. Id.
The Court reiterated that advertising would not be chilled by regulation in light of its
importance to commercial enterprises. Id. Thus, cases involving commercial speech war-
ranted a lower tolerance of false or misleading statements by the speaker. Id. (comparing
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), with Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Grove, 404 U.S. 898 (1971)). This rationale also supports governmental regulation of the
form and the content of speech to guard against deceptive advertising. Id. (comparing
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), with Banzhaf v. FCC, 405
F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969)). For a critical discussion of
these differences, see Kozinski & Banner, supra note 1, at 634-35.
One commentator gleaned five principles from the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
opinions for distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial speech:
(1) The advertiser of commercial commodities and services has better access to
the facts concerning his product than the media have to the facts in their news
reports, which may be drawn from sketchy or conflicting sources.
(2) The factual assertions in commercial advertising relate to tangible goods and
services that are more susceptible to empirical testing by regulatory authorities
than are representations made in news reports and editorials.
(3) The importance of advertising in generating profits makes it less susceptible
to the chilling effect of governmental regulation than news reporting and
editorializing.
(4) The advertiser of commercial commodities and services does not have to as-
semble the facts about his product under time pressure as do media distributors
with publication deadlines for topical material.
(5) Commercial speech has lower first amendment value than reports of news
and expressions of opinion since commercial advertising generally makes no ex-
press contribution to the forum of ideas.
Merrill, supra note 30, at 222-23 (citations omitted).
45. The Court also articulated a framework for analyzing commercial speech claims by
asking whether such speech "is so removed from any 'exposition of ideas' and from 'truth,
science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the adminis-
tration of Government,' that it lacks all protection." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 762 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), and Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
46. The Court determined that the poor, the sick, and the elderly are affected most
adversely by the prohibition, because a higher percentage of their incomes are devoted to
buying prescription drugs. Id. at 763-64.
47. Id. at 763. The Court reiterated that although an advertiser's interest may be pri-
marily economic, that fact does not necessarily preclude protection. Id. at 762. The Court
also rejected the appellant's contention that the need to maintain professionalism and ex-
pertise in the pharmaceutical industry to protect the consumer justified the ban on phar-
maceutical advertising. Id. at 766-68. Maintaining professionalism and expertise among
pharmacists was unrelated to a ban related to retail drug sales. Id. at 768. The Court
stated that the ban would affect the professional standards of pharmacists only indirectly,
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majority, even the dissemination of information that appears not to serve
the public interest should be protected because this information may be
useful in a free enterprise economic system that permits the allocation of
resources through a series of private economic decisions.48
The Court, however, limited the scope of commercial speech protec-
tion.49 First, the regulatory ban at issue in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy concededly was not a content-neutral "time, place, and manner
restriction."5 Second, the ban did not apply to false or misleading adver-
tising or to speech that proposed illegal activity.
51
While initiating a judicial movement toward First Amendment protec-
tion for commercial speech, the Court in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy offered little insight into how the definition should be applied or
how commercial speech regulations should be analyzed.52 In comparison
to subsequent opinions, the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court's an-
alytic standard is rudimentary,53 but its efforts to balance consumer and
through the potential responses of consumers reacting to disseminated information regard-
ing drug prices. Id. at 769.
48. Id. at 765 (suggesting that commercial advertising information is essential to en-
able consumers to make well-informed economic choices).
49. Id. at 770.
50. Id. at 771. Time, place, and manner restrictions often have been upheld by the
Court where they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental
interests, and allow for alternative means of communication. See Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (finding that a regulation prohibiting the use of sound
trucks emitting loud noise was permissible if it applied equally, irrespective of the content
of the noise); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(upholding the National Park Service's prohibition of sleeping in Lafayette Park and the
National Mall in Washington, D.C. as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on
expression); see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986)
(holding that an ordinance restricting the establishment of adult movie theaters within
1000 feet of each other did not violate the First Amendment). For a general discussion of
these restrictions and their validity, see Elisabeth A. Langworthy, Note, Time, Place, or
Manner Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 127 (1983).
51. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-73. The First Amendment never
has protected untruthful speech. Id. at 771 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 340 (1974), and Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 & n.10 (1961)). This limita-
tion would serve as the initial prong in the analytic framework developed in Central Hud-
son Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see infra
text accompanying note 91.
52. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24; Nutt, supra note 6, at 180-
83 (addressing the Court's definition of commercial speech in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amend-
ment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1183-85 (1988) (arguing that Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy's definition of commercial speech does not encompass all communication re-
lated to business activities).
53. Compare Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S.at 772 with Board of Trustees v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-77 (1989) (rejecting the contention that the Central Hudson stan-
dard mandates a least restrictive means analysis); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tour-
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societal interests against governmental interests established a foundation
for future analytic modes.54
2. Inconsistent Protection of the Commercial Practices of Attorneys
The Supreme Court defined the scope of its Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy holding during its subsequent term in Bates v. State Bar.55 In
Bates, two attorneys advertised their "'legal clinic' " services at reason-
able prices in a local Arizona newspaper. 6 Admitting that their action
violated a state, attorney disciplinary rule that prohibited attorney adver-
tising,57 the attorneys challenged the constitutionality of that rule. 8 The
Court concluded that the First Amendment protected truthful advertising
of routine legal services. 9
Adhering strictly to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy's precepts, 60 the
Court focused on the attorneys' advertising of routine legal services,
ism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340-44 (1986) (applying the Central Hudson framework and
rejecting a constitutional challenge to Puerto Rico's Games of Chance Act of 1948, which
permitted casino advertising to be directed only at tourists); Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel of the Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) (applying the Central Hud-
son framework in preventing disciplinary action from being taken against an attorney for
nondeceptive newspaper advertising and in upholding the State's right to require the dis-
closure of information regarding fee and cost arrangements); Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,68-69 (1983) (applying the Central Hudson framework in finding
the federal prohibition of unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements unconstitu-
tional); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565-67
(1980) (establishing a four-part analytic framework to evaluate the protection of commer-
cial speech).
54. See generally David F. McGowan, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78
CALIF. L. REV. 359 (1990) (examining the commercial speech doctrine and arguing, inter
alia, that the Court has failed to articulate a principled definition of commercial speech).
55. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). After the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the state bar asso-
ciation's imposition of disciplinary actions against two attorneys for advertising their legal
fees in the Arizona Republic, In re Bates, 555 P.2d 640, 641 (Ariz. 1976), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part sub. nom., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the attorneys appealed to
the Supreme Court, claiming that such commercial advertising regulation was unconstitu-
tional. Bates, 433 U.S. at 356.
56. Bates, 433 U.S. at 354. The attorneys sought to provide affordable legal services to
individuals with moderate incomes who did not qualify for government aid. Id.
57. Id. at 355. The rule at issue was replaced by Ethical Rule 7.2, which allows truthful
attorney advertising. ARIZ. S. Cr. R. 42.
58. Bates, 433 U.S. at 355-56. After the president of the Arizona State Bar filed a
complaint, the two attorneys appeared before a three-member Special Local Administra-
tive Committee. Id. at 356. That committee recommended that the attorneys be sus-
pended for at least six months. Id. The Board of Governors of the State Bar subsequently
reviewed the case and recommended a seven-day suspension for each attorney. Id. The
attorneys then sought review before the Supreme Court of Arizona and the Supreme
Court of the United States. Id.
59. Id. at 383.
60. Id. at 363-66.
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while excluding from its review all advertising regarding the quality of
legal services and in-person solicitation of clients.6 The Court rejected
Arizona's justifications for prohibiting attorney advertising,62 including
claims that advertising would have adverse effects on professionalism63
and that attorney advertising is inherently misleading.' The Court con-
cluded that Arizona's blanket prohibition of attorney advertising violated
the First Amendment.65
The Court was unclear, however, as to what level of First Amendment
protection attorney advertising would be afforded. Citing "'common-
sense differences'" between commercial speech and other types of pro-
tected speech, the Court emphasized that an overbroad regulation would
fail to create a powerful disincentive to advertise.66 By utilizing an ad hoc
61. Id. at 367. The Court harmonized its decision with Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy, which dealt solely with advertising of standardized products, by equating standard-
ized products with routine legal services. Id. at 372-73. The Court expressly reserved
deciding whether advertising regarding the quality of legal services would be afforded simi-
lar protection. Id. at 366. For a detailed discussion of commercial speech treatment relat-
ing to attorney advertising, see John Ratino, Note, In re R.M.J.: Reassessing the Extension
of First Amendment Protection to Attorney Advertising, 32 CAm. U. L. REV. 729 (1983).
For a general discussion of commercial speech protection for professionals, see Fred S.
McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court's Unanswered
Questions and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1985).
62. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-79. As justification for its restriction, the State Bar cited the
adverse effects of attorney advertising on professionalism, id. at 368-72, the misleading
nature of such advertising, id. at 372-75, the adverse consequences on the effective admin-
istration of justice, id. at 375-77, the detrimental economic effects of such advertising, id. at
377-78, the undesirable effect on the quality of legal service, id. at 378-79, and the difficulty
of enforcement. Id. at 379.
63. Id. at 368-72. Although the Court found the relationship between the suppression
of attorney advertising and the State's interest in regulating the potentially adverse effects
on attorney professionalism too tenuous to be credible, id., it accepted this justification one
year later in a subsequent attorney advertising case. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447, 454-56 (1978); infra notes 68-81 (discussing the Ohralik decision).
The Bates Court argued that the revelation of fees to clients prior to any initial meeting
was consistent with the ethical responsibility to disclose fees promptly upon commence-
ment of the professional relationship. Bates, 433 U.S. at 369 (citing MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-19 (1976)). The Model Code states that an attorney
should establish "a clear agreement with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to be
made ... [a]s soon as feasible after a lawyer has been employed." MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-19 (1976).
64. Bates, 433 U.S. at 372-75. The State claimed that legal services are too individual-
ized to be described fully in an advertisement; that a client will not be able to predetermine
which services she requires; and that attorneys would tend to emphasize irrelevant factors
instead of the relevant factor of skill. Bates, 433 U.S. at 372. The Court rejected this
argument because the advertised information would be relevant regardless of its potential
deceptiveness. Id.
65. Id. at 379.
66. Id. at 380-81 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976)).
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standard to balance Arizona's interest in regulating against the relevant
consumer and societal interests, 67 the Court failed to articulate specifi-
cally the exact level of protection to be granted to commercial speech.
The Court modified the Bates holding in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n,6 where it affirmed the sanctioning of an attorney for his in-person
solicitation of injured persons.69 In contrast to Bates,70 the Court found
that the State's interests in regulating in-person, attorney solicitations
were comparatively greater than a particular attorney's entitlement to
protection from suppression.71 Finding actual speech to be a "subordi-
nate component" of a business transaction,72 the Court concluded that
the regulation properly restricted the attorney's conduct.73
The Court then evaluated the countervailing state interests to deter-
mine the extent to which such regulation was permissible.74 The Court
67. Id. at 368-79. The Court decided Bates on the basis of its particular facts and
circumstances. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
68. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
69. Id. at 450. The appellant, Ohralik, visited a woman, who was injured in an auto-
mobile accident, in the hospital where he offered his legal services and asked her to sign an
agreement. Id. The appellant also contacted the injured passenger and offered his serv-
ices. Id. at 451. Both women later filed complaints against Ohralik, which were referred to
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Id. at 453.
The Board found that the appellant violated the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity. Id. DR 2-103(A) of the Ohio Code (1970) was modeled after the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Code of Professional Responsibility, and enumerated identically thereto.
70. Chralik, 436 U.S. at 455. Ohralik argued that the Bates holding should control.
Id.; see supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Bates decision).
71. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455. The Court also stated that in-person solicitation of cli-
ents by attorneys was inconsistent with the idea of the attorney-client relationship and with
the best interests of the prospective client. Id. at 454. For a detailed discussion of the
historical ban on attorney solicitation and advertising, see Note, Advertising, Solicitation
and the Professional Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972).
72. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457. The Court reasoned that the subordination of speech
resulted from the ability of the speaker to exert pressure on the receiver to respond imme-
diately and thus conclude the transaction. Id. Conversely, the advertising at issue in Bates
produced neither of these characteristics, thereby assuming a more prominent role in the
overall event. Id. (comparing the Bates facts to the Ohralik facts).
This interpretation seems to contradict the Court's definition of commercial speech in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy as speech that merely proposes a commercial transac-
tion. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)); see supra text accompanying note 43 (providing the Supreme
Court's early definition of commercial speech). However, the Court distinguished Ohralik
by noting that the appellant exerted additional pressure and persuaded the injured parties
to conclude the transaction immediately. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
73. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
74. Id. at 460-62. The State Bar cited state interests in protecting consumers and
maintaining professional standards as justifications for its regulation.' Id. at 460.
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upheld Ohio's regulation by accepting the substantiality of the State's
special responsibility to maintain high professional standards among at-
torneys; 75 the same interest it had rejected in Bates only one year ear-
lier.76 The Ohralik Court found the threat of eroding professionalism to
be more egregious than it had been in Bates, due to the " 'vexatious con-
duct' " at issue.7 7 As a result, the Court demonstrated that its method of
analysis and ultimate decision in each commercial speech case would de-
pend upon its characterization and evaluation of the relationship between
the regulation at issue and the asserted interests justifying that
restriction.78
The Ohralik Court defined commercial speech by distinguishing be-
tween speech doing no more than proposing a commercial transaction in
a traditionally regulated area and other varieties of speech.79 The Court
reasoned that unless it distinguished commercial speech from other vari-
eties of protected speech, the greater protection afforded to these other
75. Id. In support of the view that regulation of the legal profession is particularly
necessary, the Court cited, inter alia, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792
(1975) (stating that "lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of ad-
ministering justice"); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 124 (1961) (finding that lawyers are
trusted agents of their clients). Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460.
76. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Bates Court's rejec-
tion of the substantiality of Arizona's asserted interest in guarding against the potentially
adverse effects of attorney advertising on professionalism).
77. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462. In concurrence, Justice Marshall determined that the
appellant had engaged in" 'ambulance chasing,' fraught with obvious potential for misrep-
resentation and overreaching." Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring). He found the circum-
stances under which the appellant acted, more than the acts themselves, to be
objectionable. Id. at 470.
Unlike the majority, however, Justice Marshall reasoned that the informational interests
in solicitation should be entitled to protection equalling that afforded in Bates. Id. at 471;
see supra notes 55-67 (discussing Bates). Consequently, Justice Marshall would not
subordinate the free flow of information when the commercial speech is truthful and un-
pressured. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 476 (Marshall, J., concurring).
78. The Court also demonstrated that it may characterize and evaluate somewhat simi-
lar facts differently. Compare Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 454-56 (in-person solicitation) with
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 365-68 (1977) (newspaper advertising). Both cases ad-
dress attorney advertising, although Ohralik involved in-person solicitation, Ohralik, 436
U.S. at 454-55, whereas Bates only involved newspaper advertising of routine services.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 354. The Ohralik Court stated that in-person solicitation "is a business
transaction in which speech is an essential but subordinate component." Ohralik, 436 U.S.
at 457. Thus, the Court found that professionalism is more likely to be affected by in-
person solicitation than it may be in cases of newspaper advertising of routine legal serv-
ices. Id. at 457-58. The result is an extremely fact-specific standard under which the Court
will reject most attempts at analogy, yielding inconsistent decisions.
79. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56. The Court employed the familiar language of a com-
mon-sense difference between commercial speech and other varieties as a justification for
providing greater protection to the latter. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 43 (defin-
ing commercial speech).
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varieties would be diluted."0 Consequently, the Court concluded that the
Constitution affords less protection to commercial speech, "commensu-
rate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment val-
ues.""1 The Court offered no method for applying these principles to a
unitary message that proposed a commercial transaction, while also serv-
ing interests which, by themselves, would entitle the message to greater
protection.
3. Central Hudson: Articulation of an Analytic Standard
In 1980, the Supreme Court fortified the First Amendment's protection
of commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission.2 In Central Hudson, the Court invalidated the
New York Public Service Commission's (Commission) prohibition of
public utilities' promotional advertising of electricity consumption.83 The
Commission classified all advertising as either promotional 4 or informa-
tional, 5 but prohibited only the former because it contravened the
State's goal of energy conservation and tended to increase the marginal
cost of utility service.86 Although the Central Hudson Court accepted the
substantiality of the Commission's interests, it found the complete sup-
pression of commercial speech to be "more extensive than necessary" to
advance these interests.
8 7
80. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456; see McGowan, supra note 54, at 369-71 (discussing the
Court's adoption of the leveling argument in Ohralik).
81. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456. The Court neither elaborated on what these values actu-
ally are nor provided a citation as to where they can be found. Id.
82. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
83. Id. at 570. Both the New York state trial court and the intermediate appellate
court upheld the Commission's restriction. Id. at 560-61. Finding that promotional adver-
tising would not enhance private economic decision making processes because the utilities
enjoyed monopolistic status, the New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 390 N.E.2d 74.9, 757 (N.Y. 1979), rev'd sub. nom.,
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
84. The Public Service Commission defined "promotional advertising" as advertising
that was intended to encourage additional energy consumption. Central Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 559.
85. The Commission defined informational advertising to include advertising that
clearly was not intended to promote energy consumption. Id.
86. Id. at 559-60. The Commission reasoned that informational advertising would
shift consumption and would stabilize energy demand during a 24-hour period, while pro-
motional advertising would encourage consumption when conservation was necessary. Id.
87. Id. at 569-70. The Court noted that the restriction prevented utilities from adver-
tising and promoting more efficient energy sources and from encouraging a shift away from
less efficient means of energy consumption. Id. at 570.
1994] 1261
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 43:1247
The Court defined commercial speech as both an "expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience," 88 and as
a " 'commonsense distinction between speech proposing a commercial
transaction ... and other varieties of speech.' ,89 Although struggling to
delineate the specific boundaries of the classification, the Court success-
fully articulated a tangible, four-pronged, analytic framework by which
commercial speech claims could be evaluated.' The first prong of the
analysis requires a determination of whether the expression is false, mis-
leading, or proposes an illegal activity.9 ' If the expression is truthful,
nondeceptive, and proposes a lawful activity, the second prong requires
the government to assert a substantial interest to justify regulating the
speech.
92
If these two requirements are satisfied, the Court then examines the
relationship between the regulation and the governmental interest.93
88. Id. at 561. Although the Court derived its first definition from Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976),
the definition differed from the one commonly used in subsequent opinions interpreting
commercial speech as expression proposing a commercial transaction. See id. The struggle
to articulate a clear definition of commercial speech has plagued the Court since the doc-
trine's inception. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65-67 (1983) (find-
ing that all of the advertisements at issue were commercial speech by reviewing numerous
commercial characteristics, rather than applying the traditional Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy definition).
89. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)). The dual definition used by the Central Hudson Court illustrates
the inconsistency in the Court's efforts to develop a functional definition of commercial
speech. The latter definition, which the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court relied
upon, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24, became the test for identifying commercial speech in later
decisions. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989) (citing the latter defi-
nition and determining if there was a reasonable fit between the State's interests and the
regulation suppressing commercial speech); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism
Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986) (referring to the latter definition of commercial speech and
upholding the validity of a Puerto Rico gambling statute that restricted promotional adver-
tising); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 506 (1981) (citing the latter
definition); see also supra text accompanying note 43; infra note 133 and accompanying
text.
90. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. Application of this test presupposes that com-
mercial speech is the subject of the regulation. Id. at 563-64; see Fox, 492 U.S. at 473
(discussing the preliminary need to resolve whether the speech at issue is commercial
speech). Thus, the Court must determine that the expression is commercial speech before
evaluating the regulation. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64.
91. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. The Court asserted that the Constitution does
not prohibit the government from regulating commercial speech "that do[es] not accu-
rately inform the public about lawful activity." Id. at 563; see Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S.
1, 11 n.9 (1979) (noting that the government still may regulate a commercial activity that
harms the public); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457-588 (1978) (finding
that coercive advertising is not entitled to First Amendment protection).
92. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
93. Id.
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Under the third prong, the restriction must directly advance the govern-
ment's interest.94 Finally, the fourth prong mandates that the regulation
can be "no more extensive than necessary" to promote the government's
interest adequately.95 In a statement creating subsequent confusion and
debate, the Court explained that the fourth prong requires an inquiry as
to whether the interest could have been served equally well by a less re-
strictive method.96
After concluding that the promotional advertising in Central Hudson
qualified as commercial speech,97 the Court found the Commission's in-
terests in conserving energy and maintaining lower consumer utility rates
to be clearly substantial.98 The Court ultimately concluded, however,
that the promotional advertising restriction directly advanced only the
energy conservation interest.99 Applying the fourth prong to determine
whether the regulation was necessary to advance the State's interest in
energy conservation,"°° the Court held that promotional advertising of
electrical devices and services would not result in increased energy con-
94. Id. For instance, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983),
the Court invalidated a federal statute that prohibited the unsolicited advertising of contra-
ceptives. Id. at 75. The Court found that the statute only marginally promoted the State's
interest in aiding parents to control the disposition of mailbox contents, while completely
suppressing otherwise protected speech. Id. at 73.
95. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
96. Id. This issue was not resolved until the Fox decision in 1989. Board of Trustees v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477-79 (1989); see infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text (discussing
the Fox Court's acknowledgement that the fourth prong was applied inconsistently due to
confusion regarding its interpretation).
97. Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 561. Rejecting the argument that promotional adver-
tising conveyed little useful information because of the monopolistic structure of the elec-
tric utility industry, the Court reasserted that the amount of information conveyed does not
alter the protection afforded. Id. at 566-68. The fact that substitute industries may com-
pete with the electric utilities and that the overall dissemination of information would be
reduced by suppression supported the application of commercial speech status. Id. at 566-
67. The Court's rationalization of the application of commercial speech status is atypical.
See, e.g., Fox, 492 U.S. at 473 (stating without elaborating that there was no doubt that the
expression at issue was commercial speech); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism
Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986) (deciding without elaborating that the advertising being regu-
lated was commercial speech); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (stating that "it is clear enough that the speech at issue in
this case-advertising pure and simple-falls within [the] bounds [of commercial
speech]").
98. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568-69.
99. Id. at 566-68. While there was an immediate connection between promotional
advertising and the demand for energy, the Court considered the relation between the
regulation and the interest in ensuring fair and equitable rates to be highly speculative. Id.
at 569.
100. Id. at 569-70.
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sumption.101 Consequently, the Court concluded that suppressing such
advertising was not necessary to promote the State's interest in energy
conservation. 10 2 Thus, the Court held that the regulation was overly ex-
tensive under the fourth prong and therefore invalid. °3
In a concurrence replicated in subsequent decisions,"°4 Justice Black-
mun found that the majority's standard provided insufficient protection
for truthful, noncoercive commercial speech.' 0 5 Moreover, Justice Black-
mun argued that this analytic standard should not apply when a state at-
tempts "to manipulate a private economic decision" by suppressing
truthful information regarding a product or service.'0 6 Finally, Justice
Stevens, 0 7 also concurring, argued that the two definitions of commercial
speech were, respectively, too broad and too narrow.108
101. Id. at 570. The Court concluded that promotional advertising "would cause no net
increase in total energy use." Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The State failed to satisfy its burden of proof because it did not show that a
less restrictive method would not adequately serve the interest. Id. In particular, the
Court emphasized that the State should have attempted to regulate the format or content
of the promotional advertisements before categorically prohibiting them. Id. at 570-71.
104. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 486-89 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1517-21 (1993) (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
105. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun
argued that the majority's intermediate scrutiny standard should apply to commercial
speech that is misleading or coercive, or to commercial speech regulations based on time,
place, and manner restrictions. Id.
106. Id.
107. Justice Stevens' sentiments would later be reflected in his majority opinion in Dis-
covery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511-14; see infra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Stevens' opinion in Discovery Network).
108. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring). The first definition,
"'expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience,'"
would encompass speech afforded the highest degree of First Amendment protection. Id.
The second definition, "'speech proposing a commercial transaction,'" he argued, would
not include all of the communication defined as promotional advertising. Id. at 580; see
DiLullo, supra note 38, at 725-27 (addressing Justice Stevens' objections to the Central
Hudson majority's proffered definitions of commercial speech).
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent, as he had done in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 783-85 (1976) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting), that regulation of commercial speech is economic regulation, rather
than speech regulation. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He
viewed the Court's use of the label speech regulation merely as an attempt to revitalize the
doctrine of economic due process. Id. at 591. For an argument rejecting any protection for
commercial speech, see Thomas H. Jackson & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech:
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 25-36 (1979).
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4. Disparate Application of the Central Hudson Standard
In 1983, the Court, devoting increased attention to defining commercial
speech, invalidated a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited
advertisements for contraceptives in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp."' The Court found that Youngs' multi-page flyers promoting vari-
ous products, as well as its flyers devoted exclusively to advertising pro-
phylactics, 110 constituted "core" commercial speech because they did
" 'no more than propose a commercial transaction.' ",' The Court also
determined that Youngs' informational pamphlets qualified as commer-
cial speech" 2 because the pamphlets were concededly advertisements
that referred to a specific product and the sender had an economic moti-
vation for mailing them." 3
The Court then applied the Central Hudson test to evaluate the federal
regulation." 4 Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall noted that,
under the first prong, the communication was neither false, misleading,
nor related to illegal behavior and thus, was guaranteed some level of
protection. 1 5 Further, under the second prong, Justice Marshall found
that the government's interest in aiding parents' efforts to control their
children's sexual education was "undoubtedly substantial."
'"16
109. 463 U.S. 60 (1983). Title 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2) states that "[any unsolicited ad-
vertisement of matter which is designed, adapted, or intended for preventing conception is
nonmailable matter, shall not be carried or delivered by mail, and shall be disposed of as
the Postal Service directs." 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2) (1988). This statute does not apply to
unsolicited mailings in which the sender has no commercial interest. 39 U.S.C.
§ 3001(e)(2)(A) (1988); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 61 n.1.
110. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 62. Youngs, a contraceptives manufacturer, mailed three types
of materials: (1) multi-page flyers promoting various products; (2) flyers primarily or exclu-
sively promoting prophylactics; and (3) informational pamphlets promoting the general use
of prophylactics, and the use of Youngs' products, in particular. Id.
111. Id. at 66 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762).
112. Id. at 67; see Merrill, supra note 30, at 236 (evaluating the constitutional status of
commercial speech immediately after Virginia State Board of Pharmacy).
113. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67. The Court stated that while any one of these factors,
standing alone, would not compel such a decision, a combination of them did. Id.
114. Id. at 68-69. The Court reiterated that the amount of protection afforded to com-
mercial speech depends on the nature of the particular expression and the asserted govern-
mental interests. Id. at 68.
115. Id. at 69; see supra text accompanying note 91. If the communication was false,
misleading, or related to illegal behavior, the government could suppress the speech com-
pletely. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 (recognizing First Amend-
ment protection for commercial speech that is not false, misleading, or related to illegal
behavior).
116. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 73; see supra text accompanying note 92. The Court rejected
the substantiality of the State's asserted interest in preventing the delivery of unsolicited,
offensive materials to mail recipients. Bolger, 436 U.S. at 71 (citing Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977)). While the statute, as it was enacted in the nine-
teenth century, did not include either of the State's asserted interests as justifications, the
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After applying the final prongs of the Central Hudson test, 1 7 however,
the Court invalidated the federal statute." 8 Justice Marshall reasoned
that the regulation was not directly related to the governmental interest
because it provided "only the most limited incremental support" in aiding
parents to control their children's sexual education." 9 As in Central
Hudson, the federal statute also failed the fourth prong of the analysis
because it was more extensive than necessary.
120
In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.,121 the Court up-
held the Puerto Rico Games of Chance Act of 1948,122 which prohibited
casino gambling advertising targeted at residents of Puerto Rico but al-
lowed such advertising to be directed at tourists.123 After acknowledging
that the speech was not misleading or false and concerned a lawful activ-
ity under Central Hudson's first prong,124 the Court found Puerto Rico's
Court found the State's present interests acceptable because they were not diminished by
the insufficiency of the original purposes. Id.; cf City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1514-15 (1993) (reasoning that an ordinance banning commercial
handbills had been justified under a rationale different from the original rationale).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
118. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 73-75.
119. Id. at 73. Justice Marshall based this conclusion on the premise that parents al-
ready exercised discretionary control over the contents of the mail. Id. Furthermore, such
marginal protection would be achieved through a complete ban on materials that were
entirely suitable for adults. Id.
120. Id. at 74-75. The Court also noted that such a restriction would deny parents the
opportunity to discuss important issues of birth control with their children. Id. at 74. Jus-
tice Stevens, in concurrence, warned that the rigid classification of commercial speech in-
advertently could suppress speech entitled to greater protection. Id. at 81 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Moreover, recognizing that many communicative transactions contain both
commercial and noncommercial elements, Justice Stevens asserted that the debate and
analysis should focus on the style and form of governmental regulations, rather than on the
content of the message. Id. at 84. The statute at issue, he concluded, should have been
held invalid because it censored ideas, not form. Id.
Justice Stevens' view that the Court should avoid rigid classification of commercial
speech and instead should examine regulations independently to ensure that protected
speech is not suppressed provides the foundation for his majority opinion in City of Cincin-
nati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1511-13 (1993).
121. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
122. The Games of Chance Act of 1948, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 71 (1972).
123. Posadas de Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. at 332-33. The Court summarily determined that
the Act restricted pure commercial speech, doing " 'no more than propos[ing] a commer-
cial transaction.'" Id. at 340 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). Thus, the Court determined that the
Central Hudson analysis applied. Id.; see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980); supra notes 90-103 and accompanying text (dem-
onstrating the standard for evaluating challenges to commercial speech regulations). For a
detailed discussion of Posadas de Puerto Rico, see Ellen Marie Van Riper, Comment,
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company: Rolling the Dice with Central
Hudson, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 241 (1987).
124. Posadas de Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. at 340-41.
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asserted interest in protecting "the health, safety, and welfare of its citi-
zens" to be substantial, thus satisfying Central Hudson's second prong.
125
The Court then considered the latter elements of the Central Hudson
analysis.' 26 The Court deferred to the reasonable belief of the Puerto
Rico legislature and concluded that the restriction directly promoted the
legislature's interests in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of Pu-
erto Rico's citizens.' 27 The Court also found the fourth prong to be satis-
fied after the lower court modified the statute, rendering it no more
extensive than necessary to promote the governmental interest.' 28 Thus,
the Court held that the statute was valid.
In 1985, the Court revisited the issue of attorney advertising' 29 in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court.30 In
Zauderer, the Supreme Court held that while an attorney could not be
125. Id. at 341 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986),
recognizing the preservation of a community's quality of life as constituting a substantial
interest). The Puerto Rico legislature believed that advertising of casino gambling directed
at residents could increase criminal activities and destroy citizens' "' moral and cultural
patterns.'" Id.
126. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 94-95. The Court explained that these
prongs involved an analysis of "the 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means cho-
sen to accomplish those ends." Posadas de Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. at 341. The Fox Court
later used this description to define what type of" 'fit' "was required. Board of Trustees v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (quoting Posadas de Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. at 341); see infra
notes 139-52 and accompanying text (discussing the Fox holding).
127. Posadas de Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. at 342. In dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the
majority opinion because of the deference it afforded to the Puerto Rico legislature in
evaluating the fit between the restriction and the asserted interests. Id. at 352 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan also pointed out that the Court appeared to apply a rational
basis review to the relatedness prong. Id. at 351-52. The Court subsequently rejected the
application of a rational basis review in this context. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
128. Posadas de Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. at 343-44. The Superior Court of Puerto Rico
narrowed the statute's construction to ensure that it would only affect advertising aimed at
the residents of Puerto Rico. Id. at 334-36.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, argued
that truthful, noncoercive commercial speech should be fully protected under a standard of
strict scrutiny, rather than being evaluated under the intermediate scrutiny standard of
Central Hudson. Id. at 351 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan contended that the
regulation of truthful, noncoercive commercial speech is merely" 'a covert attempt by the
State to manipulate the choices of its citizens.., by depriving the public of the information
needed to make a free choice.'" Id. at 351 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 574-75 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). This, Jus-
tice Brennan argued, struck at the core of First Amendment values. Id.; see Jonathan
Weinberg, Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 720,
750 (1982) (stating that commercial speech regulations that deprive the public of informa-
tion necessary to informed decisionmaking violate core First Amendment principles).
129. See supra notes 55-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Bates and Ohralik
decisions).
130. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). For an alternative discussion of Zauderer, see Nutt, supra
note 6, at 191-93.
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disciplined for soliciting business through certain newspaper advertise-
ments,'13 a state could require the attorney to disclose particular informa-
tion regarding fee and cost arrangements to prevent deception. 132
Acknowledging the Court's ambiguous definition of commercial speech,
Justice White, writing for the majority, concluded that all attorney adver-
tising qualified as core commercial speech. 133 In a discussion that caused
substantial confusion regarding the proper application of the Central
Hudson standard,13 1 Justice White rejected the substantiality of the same
interests that the Court had accepted ten years earlier in Ohralik.35
Justice White distinguished the requirement to disclose detailed infor-
mation regarding fees and costs from outright suppression of communica-
tion 3 6 by explaining that if such disclosure requirements were neither
unduly burdensome nor likely to chill commercial speech, they would be
valid.' 37 The Court therefore sustained the validity of the Ohio regula-
131. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647. The advertisements contained nondeceptive illustra-
tions and legal advice. Id. Moreover, these illustrations primarily served to impart infor-
mation directly and to attract attention to the message. Id.
132. Id. at 652-53. In particular, the attorney would be required to disclose to potential
clients that they would be liable for certain litigation costs based on contingency fee ar-
rangements. Id.
133. Id. at 637. The advertisement, which the Court described as "advertising pure and
simple," -clearly proposed a commercial transaction. Id. In concluding this though, the
Court demonstrated its own confusion about the proper classification of a unitary message
that both proposed a commercial transaction and "'link[ed] a product to a current public
debate.'" Id. at 637 n.7 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980)). If the message only covered the latter, the Court
may have classified it as noncommercial speech and afforded it full protection. Id. The
Court also found that the advertisements were neither misleading nor false and did not
propose an illegal activity. Id. at 639-41. See generally McChesney, supra note 61 (discuss-
ing commercial speech protection for professionals); Ratino, supra note 61 (explaining the
application of the commercial speech doctrine to attorney advertising).
134. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-77 (1989) (recognizing the confu-
sion resulting, in part, from Justice Blackmun's Zauderer discussion of Central Hudson's
fourth prong).
135. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641; see supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (finding
that in-person solicitation of a traumatized person posed a greater threat to the erosion of
the professional values of attorneys). Ohio attempted to justify the blanket prohibition by
arguing that, otherwise, it would be required to distinguish between truthful and false com-
mercial speech. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 643-44. The Zauderer Court stated that commercial
speech is sufficiently important to justify imposing the costs of drawing this distinction on
the state. Id. at 646. Furthermore, the Court noted that the restriction did not promote
directly the asserted interest in maintaining professional dignity. Id. at 647-48.
136. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650.
137. Id. at 651. The rights of the party seeking to advertise are protected adequately so
long as the disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the asserted governmental
interest in precluding deception. Id. The Court therefore rejected the use of a least re-
strictive means analysis for this test. Id. at 651 n.14.
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tion requiring attorneys to inform clients of their potential liability for
litigation costs.' 38
5. Refinement of the Not More Extensive than Necessary Prong
In 1989, the Supreme Court significantly refined the fourth prong of
the Central Hudson analysis, which requires that a commercial speech
regulation be no "more extensive than ... necessary"' 39 to effectuate the
intended governmental interest, in Board of Trustees v. Fox.'4 0 In Fox,
the Court determined that commercial speech regulations are not neces-
sarily invalid if they extend beyond the least restrictive means available to
achieve substantial state interests.' 4' Before applying Central Hudson,
the Court ruled that holding " '[tiupperware parties' ,142 constituted
nothing more than a proposal of a commercial transaction.'43 This stan-
dard would be "the test for identifying commercial speech.'
144
138. Id. at 652. In dissent, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's reliance on
highly speculative substantial justifications and on vague disclosure requirements. Id. at
658-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He argued that the majority's requirements were ambigu-
ous and unduly burdensome if they actually sought to require full disclosure of fee infor-
mation. Id. at 663-64. In contrast, Justice Brennan would require the State to show that
the advertising was either "'inherently likely to deceive'" or that "'a particular form or
method of advertising has in fact been deceptive.' " Id. at 659 (quoting In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191, 202 (1982)). For a detailed analysis of In re R.M.J. and an alternate discussion of
the development of the commercial speech doctrine in the context of attorney advertising
through 1982, see Ratino, supra note 61.
Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that a state cannot be
completely precluded from regulating truthful, nondeceptive speech that may pose some
threat to its interests. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 677 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor would require a rational basis review of the state's
regulation. Id. at 678; see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505,
1510 (1993) (discussing rational basis review); Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (same).
139. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980); see supra text accompanying note 95.
140. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
141. Id. at 480. The State University of New York's (SUNY) Resolution 66-156 (1979)
prohibited the operation of private commercial enterprises on state university property.
Id. at 471-72. SUNY students, along with American Future Systems, Inc., which sold
housewares through " '[t]upperware parties,'" sued to invalidate the regulation under the
First Amendment. Id. at 472. On remand to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
issued instructions that the fourth prong of Central Hudson could be satisfied only if
SUNY's regulation was the least restrictive means available to meet the state's interests.
Fox v. Board of Trustees, 841 F.2d 1207, 1213-14 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
142. Fox, 492 U.S. at 472. A representative of American Future Systems, Inc., which
sells china, crystal, and silverware to college students, was invited into the dormitory room
of certain university students to demonstrate the products. Id.
143. Id. at 473-74.
144. Id. at 474 (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340
(1986)). The Court originally articulated this test in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
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Focusing on the requirements of Central Hudson's fourth prong,145 the
Court discussed the proper meaning of the term "necessary." 146 The
Court reviewed the interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in
McCulloch v. Maryland147 and rejected a strict interpretation of" 'neces-
sary.' ,148 Consequently, the Court expressly affirmed that the Central
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); see supra notes 38-54.
In Posadas de Puerto Rico, the Court stated that this was the test for identifying commer-
cial speech. Posadas de Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. at 340.
The respondents relied on Riley v. National Federation of Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796
(1988), wherein the Court found that North Carolina law required fundraisers to disclose
the percentages of charitable contributions made in the previous 12 months. Fox, 492 U.S.
at 474. In that case, the law compelled the presence of commercial speech. Riley, 487 U.S.
at 795. As a result, the Court provided the expression as a whole, which was noncommer-
cial, full First Amendment protection. Id. at 796. In Fox, appellants argued that because
the presentation contained information regarding home economics, a noncommercial ex-
pression, it should be considered as wholly noncommercial speech, and thus, afforded full
protection. Fox, 492 U.S. at 474.
While the Fox Court acknowledged that the tupperware parties combined noncommer-
cial elements with commercial speech, it refused to distinguish those elements because,
unlike Riley, they were not required to be inextricably interwoven with the commercial
message. Id. at 474-75.
Furthermore, relying on Bolger, the Court reiterated that when an expression contains
discussions of important public issues, it still can constitute commercial speech. Id. at 475;
see McGowan, supra note 54, at 394 (referring to commercial speech as a "negative
number" for its ability to deprive otherwise fully protected speech of full First Amendment
protection).
145. See supra text accompanying note 95.
146. Fox, 492 U.S. at 476-77.
147. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (interpreting the term "necessary"). The Court
noted that a strict interpretation of "necessary" essentially would demand a least restrictive
means analysis. Fox, 492 U.S. at 476-77. The Court also noted that its reasoning in prior
cases supported this strict interpretation. Id. at 476. In Central Hudson, the Court ex-
plained that under the fourth prong, if an interest could be served as well by a less exten-
sive regulation, then the excessive restriction would be invalid. Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980); see Kozinski & Banner,
supra note 1, at 631 (describing Central Hudson as an "ad hoc subject-specific" standard).
The Court's decision in In re R.M.J. also supports a narrowly drawn standard regarding
the extensiveness of restrictions. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 207 (1982). Justice Scalia
admitted in Fox that the Court also expressed support for the least restrictive means inter-
pretation in Zauderer. Fox, 492 U.S. at 476 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14 (1985)). Although ultimately rejecting a
strict application, the Fox Court noted that certain disclosure requirements could be re-
quired as less restrictive means. Id. at 480.
148. Fox, 492 U.S. at 476. Justice Scalia stated that the term " 'necessary,'" as it was
used in McCulloch v. Maryland, is broader than the Court's interpretations in Central Hud-
son and Zauderer. Id. at 476-77. Compare McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316 with
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 644 and Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The Fox majority acknowl-
edged that these cases could be read to suggest that a least restrictive means analysis
should be applied. Fox, 492 U.S. at 476.
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Hudson analysis "requires something short of a least-restrictive-means
standard.'
149
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia deduced that prior commercial
speech decisions mandated a finding of a "reasonable fit" between the
regulatory means and the governmental ends. 5 ° While this means-ends
fit need not represent "the single best disposition," Justice Scalia noted
that it must be proportional to the asserted interest.' 5 ' Justice Scalia dis-
tinguished rational basis review from the reasonable fit standard by ex-
plaining that the latter requires both a substantial governmental
interest-which the government has the burden of proving-and a care-
ful calculation of the cost of regulation on the freedom of speech.
152
II. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.: Heightening
Standards for Commercial Speech Regulation
A. The Sixth Circuit's Elevation of Commercial Speech
In Discovery Network, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,'53 the respondents,
commercial publishers who advertised their services on newsracks
throughout the City of Cincinnati, sought relief from the enforcement of
a local ordinance that prohibited the distribution of "commercial hand-
bills" on public property.' 54 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio granted the respondents an injunction from
enforcement. 55 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, the City of Cincinnati argued for reversal, contending pri-
marily that the "low value" of commercial speech justified the City's use
of a discriminatory ordinance. 56
149. Fox, 492 U.S. at 477. The Court, relying on its statement in Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978), explained that" 'commercial speech [enjoys] a limited
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values,'" and that the regulatory authority available in this area would be
illusory if the Court employed a least restrictive means standard. Fox, 492 U.S. at 477
(alteration in original).
150. Fox, 492 U.S. at 477-80; see also David Rownd, Comment, Muting the Commercial
Speech Doctrine: Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 38 WASH.
U. J. Urea. & CONTEMP. L. 275, 283-84 (1990) (arguing that the Fox Court should have
adopted a least restrictive means analysis under Central Hudson's fourth prong).
151. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
152. Id. at 480-81. Justice Scalia noted that a rational basis standard would require only
that the regulation advance a legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 480.
153. 946 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993); see supra notes 14-19
and accompanying text (discussing Discovery Network's factual background).
154. Discovery Network, 946 F.2d at 465.
155. Id. (stating that the district court found the ordinance to violate the First
Amendment).
156. Id. at 469.
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The Sixth Circuit rejected the claim that all commercial speech has low
value in First Amendment jurisprudence, thereby deviating from previous
Supreme Court decisions. 157 The court stated that the lesser status of
commercial speech applies only to content regulation and to the regula-
tion of the distinctive, adverse effects of the content.' 58 Otherwise, the
court found, commercial speech is afforded a high degree of protec-
tion.159 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit found that the City of Cincinnati
failed to establish a reasonable fit between the regulation and its govern-
mental interests in safety and aesthetics. 6 °
157. Id. at 469-70. The City of Cincinnati argued that because the Constitution pre-
vented it from banning newsracks completely, its limited ban on those newsracks distribut-
ing commercial speech was warranted. Id. at 469.
158. Id. at 469-70 & nn.10-11. The Sixth Circuit deduced, by dividing previous com-
mercial speech decisions into two classes, that the Supreme Court never had held that the
lesser status of commercial speech only applied to regulations of the content of commercial
speech or of the distinctive effects of the content. Id. at 470-71.
159. Id. at 471. The City ordinance regulated the manner in which commercial speech
was disseminated, rather than the content of the speech itself. Id. Also, the City was not
attempting to alleviate the harmful effects resulting from the content of the speech. Id.
160. Id. at 468. In adopting the Fox interpretation of the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson analysis, the court required the government to show that the benefits of the regu-
lation outweighed the costs of the burden on speech. Id. at 468; see supra notes 145-52 and
accompanying text (setting forth the Fox Court's interpretation of the fourth prong of the
Central Hudson analysis). The court found that the regulation completely suppressed
high-value commercial speech in an effort to pursue a policy unrelated to speech. Discov-
ery Network, 946 F.2d at 471. As a result, the court determined that the heavy burden
placed on the respondents and the public substantially outweighed the City's benefit. Id.
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the categorical ban on commercial handbills, which re-
moved only 62 of nearly 2000 newsracks from the streets, had a minuscule effect on the
City's interests in safety and aesthetics. Id.
The court digressed to discuss the level of protection afforded to commercial speech and
the rationale supporting this protection. Id. at 468-71. Discussing the rationale of Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976),
the Sixth Circuit explained that commercial speech serves important public and societal
interests, primarily in the free flow of commercial information to aid in public decision-
making. Discovery Network, 946 F.2d at 469. It noted, however, that such speech is not
totally free from governmental regulation. Id. at 469. Consequently, the government may
implement time, place, and manner restrictions on commercial speech. Id.; see supra note
50 and accompanying text (discussing time, place, and manner restrictions). It also may
suppress false or misleading speech, or speech proposing an illegal activity. Discovery Net-
work, 946 F.2d at 469.
The Sixth Circuit rejected the City's assertion that the ordinance was a constitutional
time, place, and manner restriction, id. at 470-71, and explained that the regulation could
not be justified unless it dealt "with the content of the speech itself." Id. at 470; see City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (discussing the validity of and
requirements for time, place, and manner restrictions). The Discovery Network court held
that the regulation was not content-neutral. Discovery Network, 946 F.2d at 472. How-
ever, even if it were content-neutral, the court noted, it would fail because it "is clearly not
the least restrictive means, as it places a substantially greater burden on commercial speech
than is necessary." Id. at 473. For a discussion of the three-pronged standard for evaluat-
1272
Elevating the Value of Commercial Speech?
As a result of the Sixth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court faced a
number of issues. First, the Sixth Circuit's reasoning questioned whether
all commercial speech was of low First Amendment value.' 6 ' Second, the
decision threatened to confine the Central Hudson analytic framework
162
by limiting the commercial speech inquiry to two types of cases: (1) where
the content of commercial speech is regulated; or (2) where adverse ef-
fects stemming from the speech are restricted.' 63 Finally, the Sixth Cir-
cuit's rationale for rejecting the reasonable fit argument blurred the line
between the Central Hudson standard and a least restrictive means
test.'" The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve these issues.165
B. The Majority Opinion: Failing to Find a Reasonable Fit
The Discovery Network majority ruled that commercial speech does
not always have low value with regard to First Amendment protection,
66
and it prohibited suppression of speech solely because it is labelled as
commercial speech.1 67 The Court also stated that where a state's distinc-
tion between commercial and noncommercial speech bears no relation-
ship to its substantial interests, the Court will not find a reasonable fit
between the regulation and the asserted governmental interests. 68
ing time, place, and manner restrictions, see Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1989); see also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit noted that the City could pursue various alternative
means of serving its interests. Discovery Network, 946 F.2d at 472-73. As an example, the
court suggested that newsracks could be chained to poles instead of being bolted to the
ground, as the City currently required. Id. at 472. This option would eliminate rusting and
directly serve the City's safety interest. Id. Regarding its aesthetic interest, the Court
suggested that the City regulate the size and design of the newsracks as well. Id.
161. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1511 (1993).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 91-96 (outlining the four prongs of the Central
Hudson standard).
163. Discovery Network, 946 F.2d at 470.
164. Discovery Network, 113 S.Ct. at 1510, nn.11-12.
165. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1290 (1992).
166. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511-12. The Court cited its decision in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-62
(1979), in explaining that some types of commercial speech do not qualify for First Amend-
ment protection. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1512.
167. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1514, 1516.
168. Id. at 1516. The Court emphasized that its holding does not foreclose the possibil-
ity that in a different situation, a community may be able to justify a regulation distinguish-
ing between commercial and noncommercial speech. Id.
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1. Commercial Speech Does Not Have Low First Amendment Value
The Court rejected Cincinnati's primary contention that all commercial
speech has low First Amendment value.' 69 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Stevens stated that the Court previously had relied upon "common-
sense differences," which differed only in degree.170  As set out in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,'7' these differences include the ease
with which the accuracy of commercial speech can be verified by its dis-
seminator and its durability with regard to regulation. 72 Justice Stevens
stated that the City's argument attached unwarranted significance "to the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech ... and seri-
ously underestimate[d] the value of commercial speech.'
1 73
In demonstrating the difficulty of classifying commercial speech under
the traditional definition-as speech doing "no more than proposing a
commercial transaction"-the majority claimed that even traditional
newspapers arguably were "commercial handbills," because they con-
tained advertising.'74 The Cincinnati regulation, the majority noted,
failed to distinguish newspapers from commercial handbills. 175 Neverthe-
169. Id. at 1511. Relying on this premise, Cincinnati justified its allowance of noncom-
mercial publications with greater First Amendment value (i.e. newspapers) to use the new-
sracks at the expense of commercial speech. Id.
170. Id. at 1513; see supra note 44 (discussing the term "commonsense differences").
To illustrate this point, Justice Stevens discussed the evolution of commercial speech pro-
tection and the definition of commercial speech by noting that the Court originally under-
stood commercial speech to mean speech doing "no more than propos[ing] a commercial
transaction." Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1512-13 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). Justice Ste-
vens explained that the Court expanded this understanding in Central Hudson where the
Court defined commercial speech as speech "'related solely to the economic interests of
the speaker and [the listener].'" Id. at 1513 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub-
lic Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)). He noted, however, that the Court did not
use this broader definition in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66
(1983), or in Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,473-74 (1989). Discovery Network, 113
S. Ct. at 1513. In Bolger, the Court examined the circumstances to ensure that all speech
was properly protected. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67. Finally, in Fox, the Court adopted the
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy definition for recognizing commercial speech as speech
doing no more than proposing a commercial transaction. Fox, 492 U.S. at 473-74 (citing
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762).
171. 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
172. Id.; see supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing commonsense
differences).
173. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1511-12. The ordinance at issue banned the distribution of "'commercial
handbill[s] in any public place.'" Id. at 1508 n.3 (quoting CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE § 714-
23 (1992)). However, the Cincinnati Municipal Code permitted the distribution of news-
papers on public rights of way. Id. at 1511 (citing CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE § 862-1
(1992)).
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less, after suggesting that commercial speech could not be rigidly classi-
fied, the majority assumed that all speech at issue was core commercial
speech.
176
2. Applying the Reasonable Fit Standard
Finding no challenge to the classification of the pamphlets as commer-
cial speech, the majority applied the Central Hudson standard. 77 After
stipulating to the satisfaction of the first two Central Hudson prongs, 7 s
the Court reaffirmed its statement in Fox that the fourth prong required a
reasonable fit standard. 79 Moreover, the Court explained that while a
regulation need not be the least restrictive means of achieving the gov-
ernmental interest, the existence of numerous, less-burdensome alterna-
tives is relevant in evaluating the reasonableness of the regulation." °
Justice Stevens found "ample support in the record" to conclude that
the City failed to establish a reasonable fit between the regulation and its
interests in safety and aesthetics.' 8 ' First, Justice Stevens stated that the
ordinance originally was not enacted to protect the asserted interests of
176. Id. at 1514. Thus, the Court was content to rely on the traditional definition, as
established in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, that commercial speech is that which pro-
poses a commercial transaction. Id.
177. Id. at 1509-10. In footnote 11, Justice Stevens addressed the Sixth Circuit's sugges-
tion that the Central Hudson standard might not apply when the regulation does not target
the content of the speech or effects therefrom. Id. at 1510 n.11. Because the regulation at
issue failed under Central Hudson, he passed on the opportunity to scrutinize this notion.
Id. Although the Sixth Circuit was unable to categorize this case accordingly, it still ap-
plied Central Hudson. Discovery Network, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 946 F.2d 464, 471
(6th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993). Thus, the Court concluded that the lower
court merely had suggested that such a regulation may be subject to strict scrutiny, a test
which is applied to regulations of fully protected speech. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at
1510 n.11. The Court justified its failure to answer this question definitively by pointing
out that the regulation at issue failed even under the Central Hudson standard, which rep-
resents a lower threshold than the strict scrutiny test. Id. This argument, therefore, did not
affect the disposition of the case. Id. at 1509-10.
178. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1509-10. The Court noted that there was no claim
that the speech was deceptive, coercive or proposed unlawful activity, or that the City's
interests were not substantial. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 91-92 (discussing the
first two Central Hudson prongs).
179. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510; see supra text accompanying note 95 (ex-
plaining Central Hudson's fourth prong). The Court noted that neither a least restrictive
means analysis nor a rational basis analysis is appropriate. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct.
at 1510 n.13. The Court concluded this from its rejection of the City's argument that the
Court essentially engaged in a least restrictive means analysis when it considered alterna-
tives in evaluating the prohibition. Id. The Court noted that the Fox Court expressly re-
jected this argument. Id.; see supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
180. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510 n.13.
181. Id. at 1510. The Court also expressly reaffirmed that the City had the burden to
establish a reasonable fit. Id.
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safety and aesthetics.182 Second, Justice Stevens found that the City used
the outdated ordinance to regulate commercial speech, instead of first
restricting the size, shape, appearance, or number of newsracks. 83 The
City's choice of available regulatory measures evidenced its failure to
" 'carefully calculate[ ]' " the costs and benefits related to the burden on
this particular commercial speech.' 84 Finally, Justice Stevens determined
that the cost of complete suppression of commercial speech significantly
outweighed the benefit derived from the removal of a small percentage of
the total number of newsracks.
185
The Court also held that Cincinnati failed to satisfy the reasonable fit
standard because the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech bore no relationship to Cincinnati's asserted interests in safety
and aesthetics.' 86 Justice Stevens noted that all newsracks were equally
unattractive' 87 and unsafe.188  Thus, commercial and noncommercial
handbills equally affected Cincinnati's interests in safety and aesthet-
ics.1 89 Coupled with the reasoning that truthful, noncoercive commercial
speech does not have low First Amendment value, Justice Stevens deter-
mined that suppressing only commercial handbills did not reasonably fit
Cincinnati's interests. 19°
Relying on Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,9 Justice Stevens
also discounted the City's and the dissent's argument that a reasonable fit
would exist whenever the regulation advanced the City's interests, even
182. Id. As a 19th century ordinance, it was in effect prior to the development of the
concern over newsracks. Id. The original purpose apparently was to prevent visual blight
associated with littering, not any harm associated with freestanding newsracks. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.; see supra note 160 (noting the Sixth Circuit's discussion of potential alterna-
tives to the City's use of the regulation at issue).
185. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510. The ordinance would have removed 62 of
approximately 1500 to 2000 newsracks. Id.
186. Id. at 1516.
187. Id. at 1514-15. The Court noted that the City argued in the district court that
commercial handbills tended to proliferate to a greater extent than newspapers, but failed
to reassert this argument on appeal. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1514 (stating that newsracks containing commercial handbills were no
greater an eyesore than regular newsracks).
190. Id. at 1516. The Court noted that Cincinnati did not assert any interest in prevent-
ing a particular commercial harm- the principal purpose for distinguishing between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech. Id. at 1515. If Cincinnati had asserted such an
interest, the Court implied that a restrictive regulation would have been more acceptable
because preventing commercial harm is the primary justification for regulating commercial
speech. Id. (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 81 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)). Complete suppression, however, still may have been unjustified. Id.
191. 463 U.S. 60 (1983); supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text (discussing the
holding and rationale of Bolger).
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though it placed the entire burden on commercial speech. 9 2 As in Dis-
covery Network, the Bolger Court invalidated a commercial speech regu-
lation after concluding that it provided "only the most limited
incremental support for the interest asserted."' 93
3. Rejection of the Regulation's Validity as a Time, Place, and
Manner Restriction
The Court also rejected the City's assertion that its regulation was a
constitutionally valid time, place, and manner restriction.' 94 The Court
agreed with the Sixth Circuit's holding that the basis of the regulation was
not content-neutral.'95 In addition, Justice Stevens rejected the City's in-
terpretation of prior Court statements that the justification for the regula-
tion is the proper basis for determining whether a restriction is content-
based.'9 6 Instead, Justice Stevens found that Cincinnati failed to proffer a
neutral justification for its selective ban on newsracks distributing com-
mercial handbills, and thus, failed to prove that the regulation was con-
tent-neutral.
197
192. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511. In Bolger, the Court refused to distinguish
between commercial and noncommercial.speech to justify a regulation based on the inter-
est of protecting people from receiving offensive material. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71-72.
193. Bblger, 463 U.S. at 73; see supra note 116 (discussing the asserted governmental
interests in Bolger). In Discovery Network, Justice Stevens suggested, however, that the
Court would have been more willing to accept a low value argument if the City had articu-
lated a legitimate basis for distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial speech.
Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1516. However, because the City failed to assert such a
basis, the Court found the distinction unreasonable and refused to consider the low value
argument. Id. The Court recognized the narrowness of its holding and stated that such a
distinction may be justifiable when it bears some relationship to the asserted interests. Id.
194. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1516-17 (citing, as examples, Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)).
195. Id. The Court has held that a state may impose content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions on speech. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see supra note 50 and accompanying
text (discussing time, place, and manner restrictions).
196. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1517. The City argued that because its interests
were unrelated to the content of the publications, its regulations were content-neutral. Id.
at 1516. In this regard, Justice Stevens concluded that the asserted interests did not prop-
erly justify the elimination of all newsracks disseminating commercial speech. Id. at 1517.
Furthermore, the Court found that the commercial speech newsracks did not produce
adverse secondary effects that were absent from the newsracks distributing noncommercial
speech. Id.; cf City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (accepting the
secondary effects justification as satisfying the substantial interest requirement of the Cen-
tral Hudson test). In Playtime Theatres, the City was concerned with the secondary effects
of crime and solicitation, which often resulted from the establishment of adult theaters.
Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 47-49. The City did not establish such concerns in Discovery
Network.
197. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1517.
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C. The Concurrence: Arguing for Full First Amendment Protection
While agreeing with the majority's decision and the general applicabil-
ity of the Central Hudson test, 9 ' Justice Blackmun argued in concur-
rence that commercial speech that is truthful, noncoercive, and concerns
a lawful activity should receive full First Amendment protection.' 99 Con-
sistent with his previous opinions, Justice Blackmun asserted that such
commercial speech is unquestionably " 'valuable'" to listeners and soci-
ety in general.2°°
Justice Blackmun agreed that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for
evaluating regulations of commercial speech that are deceptive, false, or
propose an illegal activity.20 1 Regulating commercial speech on these
grounds, he contended, is consistent with the judicial emphasis on the
listeners' First Amendment rights.20 2 Yet, Justice Blackmun viewed the
Court's decision in Central Hudson as more expansive, affording interme-
diate scrutiny to all commercial speech regulations. 2 3 Accordingly, he
argued, regulations of false, deceptive speech, or speech proposing an il-
legal activity would be addressed in the first prong of Central Hudson,
and any surviving regulation would receive only intermediate scrutiny.
2°4
Furthermore, under this approach, asserted interests need not relate to
the prevention of deception or coercion.20 5
Justice Blackmun concluded that Cincinnati justifiably relied on the
Court's previous statements regarding the level of First Amendment pro-
198. See supra notes 177-90 and accompanying text (explaining the majority's interpre-
tation of the Central Hudson standard).
199. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1517 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see supra notes
104-08 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Blackmun's Central Hudson concur-
rence, where he advocated full First Amendment protection for truthful, noncoercive com-
mercial speech that does not propose an illegal activity).
200. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1518 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Board
of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,486 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
201. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1517 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 1517-18 (citing Justice Blackmun's opinion in Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
573 (Blackmun, J., concurring)). Justice Blackmun noted that a listener would have little
interest in receiving false or deceptive speech or speech proposing an illegal activity. Id. at
1518. He contrasted this treatment with that of false or deceptive noncommercial speech,
or noncommercial speech proposing an illegal activity, which still is afforded full First
Amendment protection. Id. at 1518 n.1. Thus, Justice Blackmun concluded, commercial
speech is subject to regulation when it does not serve individual or societal interests in
informed decision making. Id. at 1518-19 (citing Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364
(1977)); see also id. at 1512 n.17 (majority opinion) (quoting Justice Blackmun's rationale
in Bates for affording full First Amendment protection to core commercial speech).
203. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1519 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
204. Id. (outlining the Central Hudson requirements); see supra text accompanying
notes 91-96.
205. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1519 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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tection afforded to commercial speech.2° Consequently, he suggested
that instead of reserving judgement on Central Hudson's continued appli-
cation to all commercial speech regulations, the Court should have
adopted the Sixth Circuit's reasoning that Central Hudson applies only
where the state has regulated the content of commercial speech or the
adverse effects resulting therefrom.20 7 In Justice Blackmun's view, such
an approach would ensure that truthful, noncoercive commercial speech
relating to a lawful activity would be afforded full First Amendment
protection.2 °8
D. The Dissent: Finding a Reasonable Fit
Writing in dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White
and Thomas, argued that commercial speech is properly afforded less
protection because it has low First Amendment value.20 9 As support, the
Chief Justice cited traditional reasons for this inferior status and argued
that commercial speech is more durable than other forms of First Amend-
ment expression because it is economically motivated.210 Chief Justice
Rehnquist also stated that affording equal First Amendment status to
commercial speech would erode the degree of protection afforded to
other types of speech, rather than actually elevating protection of com-
mercial speech.2 1 '
Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the City" 'carefully cal-
culated'" the burden placed on commercial speech by its regulation,21 2
thereby establishing a reasonable fit between its ban on commercial
206. Id. at 1520. He recognized that, although the City's prohibition was unconstitu-
tional, it logically and justifiably adhered to the past statements made by the Court on the
issue. Id.
207. Id. at 1521.
208. Id. Justice Blackmun found that the " 'commonsense differences,'" which the
Court relied upon to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech, did not
justify relaxed scrutiny of regulations of truthful, nondeceptive commercial speech propos-
ing a lawful activity. Id. at 1520 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976)); see supra note 44 (discussing
the term "commonsense differences").
209. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1521-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing
Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)).
210. Id. at 1522. This is one of only two commonsense differences often asserted as a
basis for distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial speech. See Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24; supra note 44 (discussing the term "commonsense
differences").
211. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1522. This argument originally was asserted in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); see also McGowan, supra note
54, at 369-71 (discussing the Court's adoption of the leveling argument in Ohralik). The
argument has been subject to criticism. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 1, at 648.
212. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1523.
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speech and its interests in safety and aesthetics.21 3 The dissent suggested
that the Court should focus on the relationship of the regulation to solv-
ing the overall problem, instead of evaluating the degree to which the
City's interests would be promoted. 14 By focusing on the overall prob-
lem, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the underinclusiveness of the
City's regulation should not render the action violative of the First
Amendment. 15
The Chief Justice attacked the majority's position that the regulation
was invalid because the distinction between commercial and noncommer-
cial speech bore no relationship to Cincinnati's interests.21 6 The dissent
noted that prior precedents, while drawing this exact distinction, never
have favored commercial speech over noncommercial speech. 1 7 Thus,
Chief Justice Rehnquist found Cincinnati's regulation to be valid because
it was actually less extensive than necessary to serve adequately the
stated interests-even though it was not wholly successful.218
213. Id.
214. Id. (noting that this inquiry is derived from the Court's analysis of time, place, and
manner restrictions, which is "'substantially similar' to the Central Hudson analysis"
(quoting Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989))).
215. Id. at 1523-24. The Chief Justice discussed Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 342 (1986), where the Court upheld a ban on promotional
advertising aimed at Puerto Rico residents by rejecting the argument that the regulation
should be invalid because it did not cover all types of advertising. Discovery Network, 113
S. Ct. at 1523; see supra notes 121-28 (discussing the Posadas de Puerto Rico holding).
Chief Justice Rehnquist also relied on Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
490, 512-14 (1981), where the Court upheld the City's ban of "off-site" billboard advertis-
ing, even though the regulation did not extend to "on-site" billboard advertising. Discov-
ery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1523-24. The Metromedia Court upheld the regulation because,
although it was underinclusive, it directly related to the asserted interests in traffic safety
and aesthetics. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511. Similarly, in Discovery Network, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist argued that the government should be free to regulate regardless of the lack
of relationship between the regulation and the content of the speech. Discovery Network,
113 S. Ct. at 1525. At least one commentator has argued, however, that underinclusive
regulations often violate the First Amendment by undermining the substantiality of the
state's interests. William E. Lee, The First Amendment Doctrine of Underbreadth, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 646 (1993).
216. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1524.
217. Id. (citing Metromedia as an example). Chief Justice Rehnquist also argued that
the majority misinterpreted Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. Id. Chief Justice
Rehnquist asserted that the Bolger Court rejected the state's interest in shielding adults
from offensive materials, regardless of whether the regulation applied to commercial or
noncommercial speech. Id.; see Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71-72
(1983).
218. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1523. In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist relied upon Posadas de Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, and Metromedia, 453 U.S.
490. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1523-25; see supra note 215.
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III. DISCOVERY NETWORiS ACHIEVEMENTS AND UNRESOLVED
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
In Discovery Network, the Supreme Court recognized that not all com-
mercial speech has low First Amendment value. 219 After Discovery Net-
work, the rationale that commercial speech is equal in value to
noncommercial speech is applicable at least to truthful, nondeceptive
commercial speech when the government fails to establish any basis for
distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial speech.22° While
Justice Stevens addressed the difficulty of attempting to classify speech
into rigid categories,22' the majority failed to offer guidance as to how
speech may be classified as commercial or noncommercial.222 Finally, the
Court demonstrated the application of the reasonable fit standard to facts
other than those in Fox22 3 and illustrated an inclination to scrutinize the
directness of the relationship between a commercial speech regulation
and the stated governmental interests.224
A. Affording Greater Value to Commercial Speech
The majority's disposition in Discovery Network clarifies previous am-
biguities concerning the value of commercial speech and the amount of
First Amendment protection it should receive. The majority's recogni-
tion that commercial speech does not have low value in all circumstances
signals a clear departure from the previous rationale, adopted by the dis-
sent in Discovery Network, that all commercial speech should be afforded
219. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1516; see supra notes 169-76 and accompanying
text.
220. See Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1509-10.
221. Id. at 1513. The Court also adhered to the traditional definition of commercial
speech-that which "does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction.' " Id. (quot-
ing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66).
222. Id. at 1514. After recognizing the futility of attempting to classify speech as com-
mercial and illustrating that newspapers actually could be classified as" 'commercial hand-
bills' " under Cincinnati's ordinance, Justice Stevens concluded that all speech at issue was
"'core' commercial speech." Id.
223. Id. at 1510.
224. Id. The Court arguably is willing to scrutinize the substantiality of the asserted
interests more rigorously as well. Because the substantiality of Cincinnati's interests was
not at issue, however, the Court did not entertain this issue.
225. See supra notes 43-54 (discussing the effects of Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy);
notes 60-67 (assessing the impact of Bates); notes 88-103 (reviewing the Court's resolution
of Central Hudson); notes 130-38 (addressing the Zauderer decision); see also Nutt, supra
note 6, at 202-04 (comparing and contrasting commercial and noncommercial speech regu-
lation analysis).
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a single level of protection.226 Although the Discovery Network Court
afforded truthful, noncoercive speech high First Amendment value, the
Court's failure to refine the Central Hudson standard to protect this new
level of value may undermine its pronouncement.227
Following Discovery Network's rationale and holding, the Court will
continue to apply the Central Hudson standard228 in determining the va-
lidity of all commercial speech regulations.229 If the Court continues to
apply the analytic framework in the same fashion, truthful, noncoercive
commercial speech will not receive full First Amendment protection.23 °
Moreover, as the concurrence discussed, false or deceptive commercial
speech, or speech proposing an illegal activity will be addressed under
Central Hudson's first prong.23' This creates two problems. First, the
Court rarely has dwelled on evaluations under this prong in earlier deci-
sions.2 32 If the Court continues this pattern, commercial speech that is
arguably false or coercive may survive scrutiny under the first prong and
subsequently, may continue to receive protection equal to that purport-
226. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511; see id. at 1516 (rejecting Cincinnati's low
value argument because its regulation did not bear any relation to its interests in public
safety and aesthetics).
227. Id. Under Discovery Network, all commercial speech will continue to be evalu-
ated under the Central Hudson standard. Id. at 1510 & n.11 (noting that because the
speech regulation at issue did not pass the intermediate scrutiny of the Central Hudson
analysis, there was no need to engage in a strict scrutiny analysis). Thus, all commercial
speech likely will receive the same level of protection. It is unclear how the Court pro-
poses to offer greater protection to a certain class of commercial speech by using the same
evaluative framework in all cases. See infra notes 228-37 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the potential effects of an unrefined Central Hudson standard subsequent to the Dis-
covery Network opinion); see also Lurie, supra note 5, at 1000-04 (proposing a separate
analytic framework for "issue advertising" and arguing that Central Hudson is essentially a
two-part test).
228. See supra notes 90-103 and accompanying text (discussing the Central Hudson
analysis).
229. See Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510 n.11. Even though the Discovery Net-
work Court did not decide whether all commercial speech regulations should be evaluated
under Central Hudson, the Court eventually will have to address this issue when a regula-
tion of truthful, noncoercive speech that bears some relationship to its asserted interests is
challenged-a fact the majority indirectly acknowledged. Id. at 1516.
230. See id. at 1517 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 1519-20; see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
232. See Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1509 (stating that "[tihere is no claim.., that
there is anything unlawful or misleading about [the speech]"); Posadas de Puerto Rico
Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340-41 (1986) (concluding that the speech at issue
was not false or misleading and did not propose an illegal activity); Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (stating that the appellants did not contend that the
advertisements were false or misleading, or related to illegal behavior); Central Hudson,
447 U.S. at 566-67 (same).
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edly afforded to high value commercial speech.233 Thus, one method of
ensuring greater protection of high value commercial speech is for the
Court to engage in more rigid scrutiny under the first prong of the Central
Hudson analysis.234
Second, even if the Court engages in rigorous scrutiny and successfully
separates all misleading or coercive commercial speech from protected
commercial speech, any speech surviving the first prong analysis will con-
tinue to receive only intermediate scrutiny.235 Conversely, noncommer-
cial speech clearly is entitled to full First Amendment protection.236 The
Discovery Network Court held that high value commercial speech could
not be selectively suppressed in favor of noncommercial speech when the
government failed to establish a neutral justification for such suppres-
sion.237 The Court's statement arguably creates a presumption of invalid-
ity for any regulation that distinguishes between commercial and
noncommercial speech without asserting a neutral justification. When a
case arises in which the government successfully establishes a neutral jus-
tification for selective suppression, the Court finally may be compelled to
demonstrate specifically how high value commercial speech will be pro-
tected. 238 Altering the application of the Central Hudson standard, how-
ever, is a necessary prerequisite to providing greater protection for
truthful, noncoercive commercial speech.
233. See Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1517-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Most
post-Central Hudson opinions have focused on the proper application of the third and
fourth prongs of the test-those standards addressing the relationship between regulation
and the asserted interests. See supra note 232. This often results from the parties' failure
to assert that the speech is false or misleading. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
Presumably, even if the speech were false or misleading, the Court may not notice such a
fact, because it most likely will not be at issue. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 1, at
630-31 (arguing that Central Hudson is an unpredictable standard); Rownd, supra note
150, at 284-85 (citing James M. Curtis, Advertising Regulated Products, 2 ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 621, 636-37 (1985)).
234. The first prong evaluates the speech to determine if it is misleading, coercive, or
proposes and illegal activity. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; see supra text accompanying
note 91.
235. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1519 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Black-
mun distinguished the standard of strict scrutiny, which requires a government regulation
to be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest. Id.
236. Riley v. National Fed'n of Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988); see supra note 144
(discussing the difference between commercial and noncommercial speech in the context
of the Riley decision).
237. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1516.
238. See id. at 1510 n.11 (stating that Cincinnati did not successfully assert a neutral
justification). Such a case also will test the theory that the Court, through its decision in
Discovery Network, has created a presumption of invalidity for any regulation that distin-
guishes between commercial and noncommercial speech without establishing a neutral ba-
sis as justification.
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B. Addressing Definitional Difficulties
Discovery Network also illustrates the Court's continuing struggle to
delineate boundaries for the classification of commercial speech.23 9 The
Discovery Network Court, however, did reject the notion that the three-
pronged test used in Bolger should be utilized as a definitional stan-
dard. 24' Nevertheless, the reaffirmance that speech that "does 'no more
than propose a commercial transaction'" will define commercial
speech, 24' and the Court's apparent acquiescence in the futility of at-
tempting to classify commercial speech into rigid categories24 2 indicates a
willingness to continue to assess definitional problems on a case-by-case
basis.243
The Court's failure to articulate a clearer means of classifying commer-
cial speech will yield future decisions in which the application of the com-
mercial speech doctrine may be unclear. As Justice Stevens noted, a
unitary communicative message rarely does no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction.244 Yet, to date, most cases have not significantly
239. Id. at 1511-13. For a general discussion of various potential definitions of commer-
cial speech, see generally Merrill, supra note 30.
240. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1513. The three-pronged test used in Bolger con-
sisted of determining whether the speech: (1) was an advertisement; (2) referred to a spe-
cific product; and (3) was made by a seller with an economic motivation. Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983). In addition to rejecting the Bolger analysis,
the Discovery Network Court reaffirmed the Fox Court's statement that speech which
"does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction'" is the standard for identifying
commercial speech. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1513 (quoting Bolger, 463 U.S. at
66).
241. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1513.
242. The Court ultimately assumed that all speech at issue was "'core' commercial
speech." Id. at 1514; see supra text accompanying note 176.
243. The Court's discussion, and somewhat arbitrary conclusion concerning the nature
of the speech at issue, clearly denotes an unwillingness to expend effort to construct a
complex definition of commercial speech. See Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511-14.
Some commentators have suggested that the Court intentionally has avoided the task of
clearly defining commercial speech because commercial advertising is not the only compo-
nent of the category. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 1, at 639-41 (explaining how com-
mercial advertising can be excluded from the current definition of commercial speech);
Daniel H. Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff": Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial
Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1225-37 (1988) (suggesting that the commercial speech
definition includes more than just commercial advertising); Schauer, supra note 52, at
1183-85 (asserting that the current definition of commercial speech is broader than com-
monly believed); McGowan, supra note 54, at 397-98 (discussing the ambiguity inherent in
the current definition of commercial speech). See generally Todd F. Simon, Defining Com-
mercial Speech: A Focus on Process Rather Than Content, 20 NEw ENG. L. REV. 215
(1984).
244. See Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511 (discussing the difficulty of classifying a
message as wholly commercial); see also Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474-75
(1989) (analyzing the level of protection afforded to a message that includes elements of
commercial speech and public debate).
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challenged the Court to determine whether a message constitutes com-
mercial speech.245 Inevitably, cases will arise where the Court's defini-
tion may be difficult, if not impossible, to apply.246 The increased
potential for misclassification may result in the unintentional suppression
of speech that otherwise would be entitled to full First Amendment pro-
21tection. 4 While the Court clearly will not construct a complex definition
of commercial speech,248 the potential for misclassification may be re-
duced by a focus on the overall function of a particular message.249
C. Clarifying the Application of the Reasonable Fit Standard
Discovery Network represents the first clear illustration of the proper
application of the reasonable fit standard developed in Fox.25° More im-
portantly, the Court demonstrated that it will reject any regulation pre-
mised solely on the low value of commercial speech, when that regulation
bears no relationship to the asserted governmental interests. 251 In con-
cluding that the City of Cincinnati failed to carefully calculate the costs of
245. Since the initial grant of First Amendment protection to commercial speech in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, only in Bolger did the Court devote significant time to
justifying its classification of the expressions at issue as commercial speech. Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983); see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). Interestingly, in
Bolger, the Court altered its definition of commercial speech to encompass all of the adver-
tisements at issue. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67. Furthermore, in Fox, Justice Scalia, relying
on Bolger, asserted that speech "can 'constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the
fact that [it] contain[s] discussions of important public issues.' " Fox, 492 U.S. at 475 (quot-
ing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67-68).
246. The Court most likely will encounter the definitional difficulty in cases similar to
Bolger, where numerous types of advertisements or expressions are at issue. See Bolger,
463 U.S. at 62.
247. Justice Stevens acknowledged the possibility of misclassification in arguing against
a broad definition of commercial speech in Central Hudson. Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 579 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Discov-
ery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1513 (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67); McGowan, supra note 54,
at 382 (arguing that no principled distinction exists between commercial and noncommer-
cial speech).
248. If Discovery Network represents a trend toward sub-classifying different types of
commercial speech and affording each category a relative level of protection, the Court
undoubtedly will create a more complex definition of the classification.
249. Justice Scalia espoused this view in Fox, 492 U.S. at 474. At least one commenta-
tor has suggested a definition of commercial speech based on a profit motive. McGowan,
supra note 54, at 390.
250. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text (discussing the Fox Court's analysis
of the fourth prong of the Central Hudson standard).
251. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1516. In cases where the government fails to
establish a relationship between the regulation of commercial speech and the asserted gov-
ernmental interests, the Court will presume the regulation to be invalid. Id. The method
by which the Court will determine whether the government has established a relationship,
however, remains unresolved.
1994] 1285
Catholic University Law Review
its regulation, the Court indicated that it will measure the degree to which
the regulation advances the asserted interests.252 Thus, not every rational
basis asserted will be sufficient,253 and the government bears the burden
of establishing the relationship.254
While the Court successfully distinguished the reasonable fit standard
from rational basis review, its attempt to distinguish the reasonable fit
standard from a least restrictive means analysis was less successful. 255
The necessary degree of correlation between the regulation and the inter-
est required to satisfy the reasonable fit standard remains unclear.256 In
Discovery Network, no relationship existed between the City's regulation
and its interests.257 Consequently, the Court will be forced to re-evaluate
this standard as soon as a case presents any relationship between the reg-
ulation and the asserted interests.258 Until it does so, analyses of such
relationships will result in inconsistent evaluations of the degree to which
the relationship between a regulation and the asserted interests must
rise.259
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Discovery Network offer two
alternate means of avoiding the problem of potentially inconsistent First
Amendment protection of commercial speech. The concurrence argues
that truthful, noncoercive commercial speech that proposes a lawful ac-
tivity should receive full First Amendment protection.2" The dissent ar-
gues that a single level of low value commercial speech should be
retained, thereby requiring intermediate scrutiny for all commercial
252. Id. at 1510 & n.13.
253. Id. at 1510 n.13.
254. Id. at 1510 n.12.
255. See id. at 1510 n.13. While the Court explicitly stated that the reasonable fit stan-
dard does not require the "'absolutely ... least severe [regulation] that will achieve the
desired end,'" it is not clear exactly where the line will be drawn. Id. (quoting Fox, 492
U.S. at 480).
256. See id. If the City were to show some relationship between the regulation and its
interests, however, it is unclear how the Court would decide the issue. In fact, the Discov-
ery Network Court only stated that the City's failure to show any relationship between the
City's commercial speech regulation and its interests in safety and aesthetics allowed the
Court to invalidate the regulation with "no difficulty." Id. at 1516.
257. Id.
258. Justice Stevens acknowledged that the Court's holding is narrow. Id.
259. The Discovery Network decision provides little, if any, notice to third parties re-
garding the constitutional requirements for the degree of correlation between a commer-
cial speech regulation and its asserted interests. In this sense, Discovery Network has
failed. As Justice Blackmun noted in his concurrence, under the Court's previous state-
ments, Cincinnati was justified in suppressing commercial handbills in favor of noncom-
mercial speech. Id. at 1520 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
260. Id. at 1518 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see supra notes 198-208 and accompanying
text.
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speech regulations.26' The Court should adopt Justice Blackmun's pro-
posal for altering the analytic standard262 and should afford truthful, non-
coercive commercial speech proposing a lawful activity full First
Amendment protection. A majority of the Court recognizes the impor-
tant role that commercial speech assumes in the daily lives of consumers
and has rejected the low value rationale advanced by the dissent.263
Based on the majority's reasoning that truthful, noncoercive speech
does not have low First Amendment value, future decisions may modify
commercial speech protection.264 Any revision of the analytic standard
for reviewing regulations of truthful, noncoercive commercial speech,
however, must include a fact-specific evaluation of the relationship be-
tween a selective regulation of commercial speech and the asserted gov-
ernmental interests. That evaluation should focus primarily on the
informational or functional value of the speech to consumers and to soci-
ety in general. Because the Court now has begun to measure the rela-
tionship between the regulation and the interests served, its next
challenge will be to clarify the method of ensuring adequate protection to
high value commercial speech.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the commercial speech doctrine has developed, the Supreme Court
has struggled to define the classification and to determine the degree of
protection that commercial speech should be afforded. City of Cincinnati
v. Discovery Network, Inc. is instrumental to the future development of
this doctrine. For the first time, the Court has rejected the notion that all
commercial speech has low value, and that such speech can be suppressed
unjustifiably to benefit noncommercial speech. In illustrating its willing-
ness to evaluate the correlation between the regulation and the stated
governmental interests under the reasonable fit standard, the Court has
heightened the government's burden of justification. While expanding
First Amendment protection, the full impact of City of Cincinnati v. Dis-
covery Network, Inc. will be realized only through judicial confrontation
of differing factual scenarios.
Edward J. McAndrew
261. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1521-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see supra
notes 209-18 and accompanying text.
262. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1517-21 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see supra
notes 201-205 and accompanying text.
263. See Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1521-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
264. See supra notes 236-37, 249-58 and accompanying text.
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